

I. In the spring of 1876 I was despatched by the Government of India to visit Gilgit, and make certain explorations in that neighbourhood in company with captain Grant. As the fullest confidence was reposed at that time by Government in the good faith and loyalty of the Jammu Durbar, the Maharaja was requested to co-operate. He at once expressed his willingness to do so, and made arrangements for the journey, the expenses of which he insisted on defraying. It has since become known that, while apparently endeavouring to insure the success of the expedition by smoothing all difficulties of travel in Kashmir territory, the Durbar threw obstacles in the way of travel beyond the frontier. On one notable occasion, when an unexpected chance of exploration in Hunza, which would have yielded valuable results, presented itself, pressure was placed on the Mir of Hunza to make him withdraw the offers he had spontaneously made, and he was threatened with the Maharaja's displeasure 'for daring to make friends with the English'. At the same time

time, when I was in Yasin territory, the Yasin vakil was taunted by the Governor of Gilgit for his master allowing me to travel safely in his country instead of treating me as Mr. Hayward had been treated.

2. While I was in Gilgit, Vakils arrived from Chitral on their way to Jammu. It was represented to me by the Governor that they had been induced to come through some pretence, but in reality to be held as hostages during my journey across the frontier. On their arrival in Jammu it appeared that they had brought an important letter offering the allegiance of Chitral and Yasin to Kashmir. This was represented by the Durbar as being unexpected and spontaneous on the part of the Chitral and Yasin Rulers, who were prompted to it by their fear of the Amir of Cabul, and their desire of protection against him. It is now known that the Durbar official deputed to fetch the Vakils from Chitral in the summer of 1876, took with him a letter, addressed by the Maharaja to the Amir Sher Ali, which was deemed of such importance that Nizam-ul-Mulk, the Ruler of Chitral's eldest son, was sent in person with it to Cabul that Autumn. It is therefore evident that

that a far more complete understanding existed at the time between Chitral and Jammu than the Durbar would have the British Government to understand.

A reference to the Cabul Diary for August 1876 also shows that the friendly relations between Chitral and Jammu were sufficiently close to rouse the Amir's apprehensions. These apprehensions may have been assumed, but it appears more probable that they were real, and that Nizam-ul-Mulk's deputation to Cabul two months later was to re-assure the Amir as to the real feelings covertly entertained in Chitral and Jammu.

3. In November 1876, His Excellency the Viceroy met the Maharaja at Madhopore, and made known to him his wish that Chitral and Yasin should be brought under the control of Kashmir, which the Maharaja expressed his ability and willingness to accomplish by peaceful negotiations. Without making any allusion to the good understanding he already had with the Chitral Chief His Highness begged the Viceroy to favour him 'with a written authority to commence negotiations, in order that it may not be in the power of evil-disposed persons hereafter to accuse him

him

him of entering into relations with foreign States for his own ends.

As a proof of the confidence reposed in the Maharaja and to enable him to strengthen his Gilgit frontier, he was presented with five thousand rifles and a suitable quantity of ammunition.

4. The Viceroy then expressed his wish to station a British officer at Gilgit. This proposal was not new to the Indian Government, as it had been first mooted in 1874 by Sir T.D.Forsyth, but to the Maharaja it evidently came unexpectedly. On the following day he signified his consent and cordial co-operation, merely raising difficulties on points of detail. A further present of a mountain battery completely equipped was made to him. At the Delhi Assemblage, a month later, special honours were conferred on the Maharaja, and in a letter, dated 22nd December 1876, the Viceroy authorised him to proceed as quickly as possible with the negotiations for bringing Chitral and Yasin under allegiance.

5. During the spring of 1877, frequent correspondence passed between Chitral and Jammu, the only object of which (as far as can be known from the Durbar's communications to the Government of India) seems to

have

been to make the British Government believe that no previous understanding existed between the two Rulers. The Durbar also laid frequent stress on the fears entertained by Aman-ul-Mulk, lest he should be attacked by the Amir at the very time when friendly arrangements were on foot for the betrothal of the daughter of the Chitral Ruler to the Amir's heir-apparent, Abdullah Jan, the first proposal for this alliance having emanated from Chitral.

6. On the 9th July 1877, a meeting took place on the Ponyal frontier between Nizam-ul-Mulk, Pahlwan Bahadur, the Mir of Yasin, and the Governor of Gilgit. The ostensible object of the meeting was to re-assure the Chitral and Yasin Rulers as to the extent of the allegiance required of them, and to make them a gift of money. The real object of the meeting was to enable Nizam-ul-Mulk to deliver the Amir's answer to the letter he had carried to Cabul in the preceding autumn, in reward for which service he received the sum of Rs. 3,000/-. A brief study of the letter from Aman-ul-Mulk to the Maharaja forwarded to the Government by the latter on the 8th July, and the letters of the Officer on Special Duty in Srinagar

Srinagar concerning it, will show that the meeting at Tammasshki had nothing to do with the proposed treaty. The reports submitted to Government by the Durbar of the negotiations in progress with Yasin and Chitral, also show that a considerable change took place in the relative plans of the Durbar towards the Rulers of both States about this time which will be noted further on.

7. A strong desire was also evident on the Maharaja's part all through 1877 to obtain the sanction of Government to his pushing his influence in Dir, Swat, and Bajor, to which latter place he proposed sending the Sirdar, Yahyah Khan, who was then residing in Jammu, and who later played a somewhat conspicuous part in Cabul affairs.

8. In October the Chitral Vakil, who had arrived in the beginning of July, was despatched from Srinagar with the proposed treaty for Aman-ul-Mulk's acceptance, of which the Durbar was so confident that, without waiting to ascertain whether Aman-ul-Mulk's views had undergone any change, a year's subsidy was sent to Chitral in advance, in addition to the money

money already paid in July. In truth the understanding between Chitral and Jammu was already completely established, and it is to be noted that, though the Yasin Ruler had shown himself less open to friendly advances from Jammu, and therefore requiring more conciliation, his first subsidy was not paid till the following summer.

9. The so-called treaty was in fact only a one-sided engagement on the part of the Chitral Ruler to enter into offensive and defensive alliance with the Maharaja, to whom he promised to render nominal allegiance in return for a yearly subsidy. It was said at the time that the ratified treaty with Aman-ul-Mulk's signature was to be brought to Jammu in 1878 by the Chitral Ruler's son, but no son of Aman-ul-Mulk has yet visited Jammu, nor has the Durbar again alluded to this intention.

10. Meanwhile preparations for the coming of the British Officer to Gilgit were being made. During the spring and summer of 1877 vague and contradictory reports were ^{made} to Government of threatened disturbances on the frontier. Subsequent investigations showed that there had not been the slightest foundation for them.

The object of them was to impress on Government that the Gilgit frontier was dangerous and unsafe for the residence of a British Officer. The people of Gilgit were told to expect unendurable oppression from the residence among them of a British Officer, and all were warned against offering service to him or speaking to him without permission from the Governor, under pain of punishment. The headmen were enjoined to co-operate in driving him from the place by alarming reports and making things uncomfortable for him.

11. An unexpected occurrence, however, caused these plans to miscarry. During the summer of 1877 several ^{hundred} Gilgits went to Kashmir to appeal to the Maharaja against the Governor, and the latter was summoned down to answer the charges made against him, leaving his son, a young and inexperienced man, in charge.

An unusually early and severe winter prevented the Governor's return before the passes became closed by the snow. I arrived in Gilgit at the end of November, and the officiating Governor began to act on the lines laid down for him with more zeal than discretion. My baggage was openly plundered by an official without any attempt being

made to enforce reparation or punishment, false reports of an alarming nature were made to me, a report was transmitted to the Government that the Governor would not be responsible for my safety, and the assistance of the Chitral Ruler was invoked to add to my apprehensions under guise of a friendly regard for my welfare.

12. The Governor and his son were withdrawn by the Durbar at the first representation of this disloyal behaviour, and so complete was the confidence of Government in the Maharaja's good faith that no suspicion was entertained that these proceedings had been instigated from Jammu. The Governor appointed in place of the one removed was a man who had been a short time previously disgraced and temporarily dismissed from the Maharaja's service for mal-practices. Finding that the system of false alarms and intimidation would only arouse suspicion, a different course was pursued.

13. In October 1878, I visited Yasin and Chitral, my return to Gilgit being hastened by the outbreak of hostilities with Cabul. My journey was opposed by the Durbar, who have throughout shown the same desire to obstruct direct dealings of the British

Government with the Chiefs on the Gilgit frontier that they manifested to our dealings with the Atalik Ghazi in former years. The difference of reception I met with from the two Chiefs was great. Pahlwan Bahadur, the Yasin Chief, told me frankly that he had not wished me to come, but having come he would spare no trouble to make me welcome. He expressed his desire to have direct relations with the British Government, and to have nothing more to do with the Kashmir Government whom he thoroughly distrusted. It required much pressure on my part to induce him to send his Vakils to Jammu for the yearly subsidy, which he evidently cared little about, while he complained of the want of ceremony with which he was treated by the Durbar. Hunting and races were got up for my amusement; I was invited to prolong my stay and travel where I pleased, no importunate demands were made of me, and everything was done to facilitate my journey to Chitral.

14. In contrast to this, Aman-ul-mulk, the Ruler of Chitral, while affecting to take credit for inviting me to his country, complained that my coming was calculated to prejudice him in the eyes of his people, a statement for which, I believe there was no foundation. The presents I gave ^{him} were accepted with

with little courtesy, and hourly imper-
tunities were made for money and other
presents; constant efforts were made to
prejudice me against Pahlwan, and I was
subjected to numerous small vexations about
supplies. In spite of promises to break off
dealings with Cabul a vakil was despatched
to the Amir three or four days after I left
Chitral, though it was known that
hostilities had commenced. On my alluding on
one occasion to the treaty he had just
executed with the Maharaja, he refused to
discuss it impatiently, not to say
contemptuously, showing that it possessed
no importance in his eyes.

15. After my return to Gilgit,
Pahlwan adhered steadily to the course of
friendship towards the British Government
which he had professed to me in Yasin. He
took considerable pains to give me early
and accurate information of Badakshan affairs,
and on one occasion sent me a letter from
the son of the Akhund of Swat calling on him
to join in Jehad against the English.

16. Aman-ul-Mulk's conduct varied
weekly, according to the progress of the war
and the false rumours of the British
reverses that reached Chitral from time to
time. Since the death of Amir Sher Ali his
conduct

conduct has been more consistent, but he has been, and is always, shifty and unreliable, and he has always shown his displeasure at the good understanding existing between Pahlwan and the British Officer in Gilgit.

17. In March or April 1880 a sudden change took place ~~in~~ in Pahlwan's dealings with Gilgit, which I am unable to account for, unless on the supposition that it was caused by the asylum given to his enemy, Shahzada Hassan, the ex-Mir of Badakshan.

18. The system of 'boycotting' is of recent introduction into Ireland, but I can testify that it has been in existence in Gilgit for a longer period. During my residence there everthing was done to create discomfort in small matters. The people of the country were abused and ~~f~~ frequently punished for rendering small services to myself and followers. Constant difficulties were raised about supplies, quarrels and discontents were ~~for~~mented among my servants, and pressure was put upon them in small matters to force them to leave my service. On one occasion my followers clubbed together to induce a small trader to bring from Kashmir supplies not procurable in Gilgit. The

goods were seized and sold forcibly at less than cost price, and a heavy fine was inflicted on the trader 'for daring to serve the English'.

The slightest demonstration of goodwill towards the English Officers in Gilgit exposed persons of every degree to violent abuse, threats, and punishment. During the recent disturbances in Gilgit the Governor took advantage of certain orders I had given to try and excite the people against me.

19. In more important matters no suggestion made by me from first to last has been attended to. In fact I have generally found it sufficient for a thing to be suggested by me to insure it not being done. So small a matter as the repair of rest-houses on the passes to facilitate winter communication between Kashmir and Gilgit, which I have urged on the Durbar for four years, has not been carried out. In the winter of 1877-78 upwards of a hundred men perished on the Tragbal pass alone, yet the arrangements on the Zozi Pass, between Kashmir and Leh, show that the Durbar is aware of what is required to keep open winter communication. The rest-houses on the passes between Kashmir and Gilgit appear to have been purposely allowed to
fall

fall to ruins in the last three years. The improved arms given to the Maharaja to strengthen the Gilgit frontier have been withheld and kept for regiments at Jammu. In some cases, the regiments in possession of the arms have been deprived of them before being sent to Gilgit. The friendship shown for myself by the Yasin Chief, instead of being a matter of congratulation, excited the Maharaja's barely concealed displeasure. The disturbances which have lately occurred in Gilgit were the results of intrigues, the primary object of which was to accomplish his ruin. With reference to this I would call attention to the following sentence written to the Governor of Gilgit by the Jammu news-writer in Chitral in February last:-

"The destruction of Pahlwan was complete on that day, when the parwana of the Maharaja of 5th Phagun 1937 - 14th January 1881, brought by the hand of his servants, was received by him (Aman-ul-Mulk)."

20. It may be well to relate here a matter which I have not reported to Government. When Pahlwan Bahadur was on his way to Chitral with a few followers after

the failure of his attack on Panyal, he was met at Tirah by Mian Rahat Shah, the Agent of the Punjab Government residing in Chitral, who upbraided him with his conduct. Pahlwan replied that he had no fear for the consequences as he had a hold on the Jammu Government. He said that he held two letters, one from the former Governor of Gilgit brought by a Jammu wakil, Adjutant Sher Ali, and the other from the present Governor, brought by his own foster brother, Mazar Hayat, both to the same effect viz., that great rewards would be given him if he would show himself to be a true friend to the Maharaja, and perform the service which would be told him verbally by the bearer of the letter. The verbal message in each case was the same viz., that he should by some artifice induce the British Officer in Gilgit to visit Yasin and there kill him. Pahlwan then called up Mazar Hayat, who was then present and without preparation ordered him to repeat the message he had brought from Gilgit, which he did in the same terms. Pahlwan swore to the truth of his statement on the Koran, and said that he still had the possession of the letters.

21. It is here worth noting the

change of policy pursued by the Durbar towards the ²Yasin Ruler, from what was at first apparently contemplated. In March 1877, vakils from Chitral and Yasin were dismissed from Jammu. The Yasin wakil took back a present of Rs.5,000/- to Pahlwan Bahadur, the Chitral wakil took back nothing, pending further negotiations, but Mian Mahassar Shah, the Maharaja's Agent, who visited Chitral about the same time was instructed to suggest Rs.5,000/- as a suitable subsidy for Aman-ul-Mulk. It is evident that Yasin was treated at this time as independent of Chitral. At the Tammashki meeting in July, Pahlwan showed himself extremely averse to any close relations with Kashmir, in spite of his previous tender of allegiance, and in spite of the, to him, large sum of money that had been given him. He is also said to have abused the Governor of Gilgit, upbraiding him with faithlessness (nimuk-harami). In October when the engagement with Aman-ul-Mulk was drawn up, the Chitral subsidy was fixed at Rs.15,000/- and no mention was made in it of any subsidy for Pahlwan. (N.B. All money transactions on the Gilgit frontier are in the old Kashmir coinage, of which Rs.15,000/- equal Rs.12,000/- present

coinage, or Rs.7,500/- Calcutta coinage.) Afterwards a subsidy of Rs.2,700/- was paid to him, but no written agreement was given him, his position as an independent Chief has been steadily ignored, a constant policy of exasperation has been pursued, and he has been treated throughout as a subject of the Ruler of Chitral.

"Taking into consideration the chariness of the Jammu Durbar in parting with money, and contrasting the large subsidy assigned to Aman-ul-Mulk with that first suggested, the small subsidy given to the Yasin Ruler with the large sum at first given to him, in addition to presents given at Tammashki, without any adequate necessity, together with the subsequent policy pursued towards Pahlwan and the anger displayed by him at Tammashki without apparent cause, it is evident that the Durbar must have entertained some project in the spring of 1877 with regard to Pahlwan, which they were unable to carry out. The inference that suggests itself to me is that a proposal was made to Pahlwan, whose proximity to Gilgit and rough character made ^{him} appear the most available instrument to enter into a plot against the British Officer shortly expected to arrive in Gilgit, and that on his refusal to expose himself to the fate of his brother

Mir Wali

Mir Wali, the Durbar threw him over, and found a more willing instrument in Aman-ul-Mulk. The first of the two letters mentioned by Pahlwan to Rahat Shah was probably sent in the spring or summer of 1877.

22. In further confirmation of this view it is to be noted that in March 1877 the Maharaja forwarded to Government a letter from Aman-ul-Mulk, which showed that he was apparently wavering in his mind as to the tender of allegiance to Jammu which he had made. Yet, at an interview with Major Henderson and myself in October 1877, the Maharaja said, that from the very commencement of the negotiations Aman-ul-Mulk, had never shown any sign of wavering, but on all occasions had been ready to prove his sincerity".

23. The misgovernment and oppression suffered by the people of Gilgit during the last three years exceeds what they had to endure from former Governors. After the result of this had become apparent in the recent disturbances, it would be thought that some relaxation of harshness would be found advisable. During the last three months things have gone from bad to worse, and the system of desultory oppression has

changed to one of wholesale plunder. I make no special mention of torture by which exortation is enforced because Gilgit is in no way different from other parts of the Maharaja's dominions in this respect. It is the increase of oppression to which I desire to attract attention. In the middle of January last, when wheat-sowing takes place, it came to my knowledge that no wheat-sowing was being done, in most cases for want of seed-corn, in some because the people were intending to emigrate in the spring. Finding that the report was true, I brought the matter to the notice of the Governor, which after some delay, resulted in the Government stores being opened and seed-corn being sold at exorbitant rates to the people. Several times during the last summer the wazirs and mukuddams represented to the Governor that the people would certainly leave the Maharaja's territory and settle elsewhere if the oppression continued. On each occasion they were answered with abuse and told that the people might go anywhere they pleased. In September last the Governor gave out that the Maharaja contemplated abandoning Gilgit altogether. It is my belief that for some time past a purpose has existed of producing an explosion among the people, which was to

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be represented as the inevitable result of the residence of a British Officer.

Petitions have been presented to me by the Chief men of Panyal and Gilgit declaring the inability of the people to endure any longer the misgovernment to which they were subjected, and appealing to the British Government to interfere in their behalf. A similar representation has been made to me verbally by the Wazir of Astor. I have lived among the people of Gilgit for over three years, and know them well. They are quiet, peaceable, easy to govern, neither turbulent nor fanatical. Their chief defect is want of energy and enterprise.

24. I have already reported to Government how, during the recent disturbances, the conduct of the ringleader of the disaffected was condoned and screened by the Governor, in spite of the murder of a loyal Raja. I believe the intention of this act was, that having a hold over this man he might be used in future as an instrument for misdeeds. The Governor's greed, however, caused him to overshoot the mark. A promise of a bribe, larger than he was able to pay, was extorted from the Wazir, and when, after his release, having paid all he was able to pay, he was still pressed for further

payment, in despair he voluntarily placed himself in my hands.

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33. Yasin and the Yarkhun valley on the Chitral side of the watershed have belonged for many generations to the Khushwakti family, as the rest of the Chitral valley down to the Afghan boundary (Asmar) have belonged to the Kathore family. On the left bank of the Kashgar river the Kushwakti boundary extends to below Barenis, within 20 miles of Chitral. Though descended from a common ancestor and closely connected by intermarriage in every generation, frequent hostilities have occurred between the Rulers of the two countries. The balance of success has generally been, if anything, on the side of Khushwakti, who have shown the greater amount of warlike skill. No permanent change of boundary has, however, followed such success, as there seems to be a recognised understanding, which is supported by the people, that no such change should take place. The utmost that has followed on the defeat of any Ruler has been the transfer of his territory to another of the same family. On the whole it may be said that down to recent times the influence of one Ruler or the other has

preponderated according to the personal qualities possessed by each for the time being. At no time has tribute been paid by any Ruler of either State to the other. During my visit to Yasin and Chitral in 1878, I took some pains to ascertain the nature of the relations existing between the two Rulers. Pahlwan said:-

"Aman-ul-Mulk is my uncle, and I follow his advice in most things. It is true that he is richer and more powerful than me, but I can do as ^I please, and I owe him no allegiance; Yasin belongs to me and not to him."

"At a private interview I pressed Aman-ul-Mulk to say if Yasin owed him allegiance, but he evaded my question saying, "Pahlwan is my son and can do nothing without me". The Yasin Wazirs all repudiated the idea of any obedience being due on their part to any member of the Kathore family.

34. Owing to various causes, of late years the power of Yasin has declined, while that of Chitral has increased. The establishment of the Hindu power in Gilgit, frequent changes of Rulers, and frequent wars entailing serious diminution of population, have all contributed to lower the power of the Khushwakti. On the other hand, ~~the~~ increased trade between Badakshan and

Peshawar, consequent on the establishment of a settled Government in the latter place, has largely increased the dues paid to the Chitral Ruler by merchants passing through, and Chitral produce now finds in the Punjab a market which formerly did not exist. Aman-ul-Mulk, the present Ruler, has also held unchallenged possession of power for 30 years. Though scarcely able to cope with Afghans, the large privileged class in both States forms the most warlike portion of the population contiguous to the Gilgit frontier. The people are Sunnis, Shiahs, and Manlais, mixed.

35. The importance to India of the two States consists in the possession of the passes across the Hindu Kush, leading from the upper Oxus to the Punjab.

"These are:-

The Dorab	:	The Ochili
" Khatinza	:	" Khankon
" Nuksan	:	" Baroghil
" Agram	:	" Darkot
" Kutch	:	" Ishkoman

"Two of these, the Dorab and the Baroghil have been traversed by artillery. There is also an excellent road from Badakshan down the Chitral valley, diverging below Chitral to Jellalabad and Peshawar. The Chitral Rulers have always held close relations with Badakshan, and watch closely all that takes place

place there, as it is the only quarter from which they fear attack. Aman-ul-Mulk is extremely averse to the re-establishment of Afghan rule in Badakshan, and is at present working to place the country under the influence of the Amir of Bokhara.

36. Aman-ul-Mulk is a man of about 60 years of age, noted for his cunning and treacherous character among a people who are themselves adepts at deceit. Pahlwan Bahadur, when I met him in 1878, confided to me his deep distrust of his uncle, and his constant fear lest he should fall a victim to some deep-laid scheme. His fears were not misplaced. There can be little doubt that the late attack on Gilgit, and its result, as far as Pahlwan is concerned, were the outcome of a preconcerted plan between Chitral and Jammu. The heir-designate, Nizam-ul-Mulk, is about 19 years of age. He is apparently not very popular, and has as yet shown little ability. His uterine brother, Afzal-ul-Mulk is said to show considerable promise of ability. The most popular of the sons of Aman-ul-Mulk are Shah-i-Mulk and Murid. Aman-ul-Mulk's death will possibly be followed by a struggle for power between the brothers.

"When I was in Calcutta last winter, 1879-80, the unsatisfactory nature of our

dealings with Chitral through the Jammu Durbar was recognised by Government, and I believe it was intended to put them on a different footing. The question of the retention of Jellalabad was in suspense, and it was thought that direct communication with Chitral might be maintained from that place. In March, His Excellency the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, told me that he intended to take advantage of his approaching meeting with the Maharaja at Umballa, to make different arrangements from those then existing, and I believe it was proposed to improve the position of the Yasin Ruler. The Umballa interview was, however, postponed, and in view of his shortly expected departure from India, His Excellency decided on leaving the matter in abeyance. As a step towards securing the good-will and adherence of the Yasin ruler the sum of Rs.3,000/- was granted to me to give to him. This I intended to have given him on my meeting him in September. The intended journey to Chitral was, however, counterordered, and I was only able to send him Rs.500/- through Jamadar Khan Bahadur as a proof the friendly intentions of the British Government, trusting to be able to arrange for a meeting with him on the frontier later. Affairs, however, took the course that

is known to Government.

38. Pahlwan is detained under surveillance in Chitral, and his territory has been temporarily portioned out between three of the Khushwakti. Aman-ul-Mulk would probably prefer to hold the whole country down to the Gilgit frontier himself, but local feeling would hardly permit this, nor would he be able to retain it long without external support. He is also inclining in his mind to restore Pahlwan, for whom Nizam-ul-Mulk entertains strong personal attachment, but he can scarcely do this without laying himself open to the imputation of unfriendliness to Kashmir. I believe it is to gain support for one or other of these plans that Aman-ul-Mulk has lately repeatedly expressed a wish for an early meeting with me. Were Pahlwan to be restored, his late experiences would no doubt make him subservient in future to his uncle's policy.

39. For many years Aman-ul-Mulk has been the Agent for promoting correspondence from Jammu with Cabul and Tashkend. In 1874, he forwarded a letter to Cabul. In 1874 or 1875 he forwarded a letter to Tashkend. In 1876, as above mentioned, he sent his son to Cabul with an important communication.

In 1877 he sent a letter to Tashkend. Last year he forwarded to Jammu a letter from Tashkend, and was instructed not to break off communications with Cabul, and two months ago he forwarded a secret letter to some place north of the Oxus which I believe to have been intended for Tashkend. There are probably other instances with which I am unacquainted. It is evident that the relations existing between Jammu and Chitral are very different from what the Durbar desires to be believed.

40. Gilgit was first occupied by the Sikhs in 1841 or 1842, and passed with Kashmir to the Dogras in 1846. Though twice expelled, once for a period of eight years, the Jammu Government has retained its position without interruption since 1860. The policy and methods pursued by the Durbar have not changed from what they were 28 years ago, notwithstanding the support given by the British Government for the last three years. Writing of affairs in Gilgit between 1852 and 1860, Pandit Manphul says:-

"The policy pursued by Maharaja Golab Singh, and his son and successor Maharaja Ranbir Singh after him, to recover and hold Gilgit and protect his frontier in that

that direction, has been a regular series of complicated political intrigues with foreign neighbouring powers. Instead of adopting bold decisive measures, which he was too well able to do, to turn out a marauding invader, and strengthen his frontier of Gilgit, in conformance to the repeated wishes and advice of the Resident, or referring this matter, as well as other subsequent issues for adjudication to the British Government as stipulated in Article IV and V of the treaty, the Maharaja simply posting a regiment at Bunji to guard his frontier in the direction of Gilgit, employed secret agents to sow or revive the seeds of dissension amongst the Chitral and Yaghistan Chiefs, with a view to bring about a combination of circumstances which might involve Gohr Aman (the Yasin Ruler) into trouble, and promised pecuniary aid to all such as might rise against him.

41. Of the value of Gilgit in the hands of a tributary power loyal to the Indian Government there can be little doubt. Sir Henry Duarand wrote in 1870:-

"I think it a doubtful policy allowing the Chitral Chief to establish himself in the Gilgit valley which the occupation of Yasin virtually amounts to (referring to the

expulsion of Mir wali.). As a mere matter of policy, it is more to our interests that the head of the Gilgit valley be in the hands of Kashmir than in the hands of Chitral, for a glance at the map shows the value of a friendly and substantive hold by any adequate force up to the watershed between the Gilgit and Chitral valleys; it would be an immense curb on the triangle, or more strictly speaking, the quadrangle between the Kunar or Chitral rivers, and the Indus".

"But if this advantageous position is to be used merely for disloyal purposes, it becomes a question whether the Maharaja's boundary had better be brought back to the west side of the Indus, to a more defensible and, to him, less expensive line of frontier.

42. The present uncertainty as to the future of Badakshan and the internal state of Kashmir necessitate a full consideration of the subject in relation to the whole question of our Cabul policy. The present state of things in Kashmir cannot continue much longer without a crisis of some kind. The residence of a British Officer in Gilgit is, however, impossible

without the loyal co-operation of the Kashmir Government and can conduce neither to the honour or interests of the British Government. Still more is this the case if the Jammu Durbar pursues a policy not passively, but actively, hostile to us. To merely withdraw the officer would, however, be to encourage the Maharaja to prosecute his intrigues to greater advantage. He has received the benefit of a valuable gift of arms, he has obtained the sanction of Government to his questionable dealings with Chitral, and will be able to show the Native Princes of India that, following the example of the king of Burma and the Amir of Cabul, he has rid himself of the presence of a British Political Agent. It is also daily becoming more important that Government should have early and correct information of what goes on in Badakshan, Sarikol, Chitral and Gilgit. The whole question hinges on our future relations with the Jammu Durbar.